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Footnotes
1. I became aware of this article because of it being posted by Judge
Kevin Burke in his blog (see blog.amjudges.org/). 
In Who’s a Good Boy? U.S. Supreme Court Considers AgainWhether Dog Sniffs Are Searches (Justic, January 16, 2019),Professor Sherry F. Colb notes that the United States
Supreme Court “is currently considering whether to grant
review in Edstrom v. Minnesota.” She indicates that this “pre-
sents the issue whether police must obtain a search warrant
before bringing a trained narcotics dog to sniff at a person’s
door for illicit drugs.” Professor Colb’s article goes on to con-
sider prior occasions in which the Supreme Court of the
United States has considered the constitutionality of searches
though dog sniffing.1
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court denied the
application for certiorari in Edstrom v. Minnesota (2019 WL
888181). As a result, it will not be considering the dog-sniff
issue raised in that case. 
Professor Colb’s article made me think about the law of dog-
sniffing-related searches in my country. As a result, in this
column, I intend to look at how the use of sniffer-dogs searches
has been addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada.  
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Canada’s initial consideration of this
issue came in the companion cases of R. v. Kang-Brown, 2008
SCC 18, and R. v. A.M., 2008 SCC 19.  The issue was framed
in the context of whether the use of the sniffer dogs in these
cases constituted a search and if so, whether the search was
reasonable in the context of section 8 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982. That section
of the Charter states:
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure.
SECTION 8 OF THE CHARTER
In Canada, section 8 of the Charter has been interpreted
such that “the ‘search or seizure’ question reduces to whether
the act intruded on the claimant’s ‘reasonable expectation of
privacy’. If not, there was no ‘search or seizure’ and no viola-
tion of section 8” (see Steven Penney, The Digitization of Sec-
tion 8 of the Charter: Reform or Revolution? (2014), 67 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 505, at paragraphs 6 to 8). In R. v. Spencer, 2 S.C.R. 212,
the Supreme Court of Canada held that a “sniffer dog provides
information about the contents of the bag and therefore
engages the privacy interests relating to its contents” (at para-
graph 47).  
In the Canadian context, a violation of section 8 of the
Charter can lead to exclusion of evidence pursuant to section
24(2) of the Charter, which states:
Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court
concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that
infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed
by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is
established that, having regard to all of the circum-
stances, the admission of it in the proceedings would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
R. V. KANG-BROWN
In Kang-Brown, a police officer involved in an operation
designed to detect drug couriers at bus stations approached the
accused, identified himself, and asked the accused if he was
carrying narcotics. The accused said no. The officer then asked
to look in the accused’s bag. Another officer with a sniffer dog
approached. The dog sat down, indicating the presence of
drugs in the bag. The accused was searched and drugs were
found on his person and in his bag. 
The trial judge found that the accused was neither arbitrar-
ily detained nor unlawfully searched and entered a conviction.
The Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. An appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada.
R. V. A.M. 
In A.M., the police used a sniffer dog to search a school for
the presence of drugs. In a gymnasium, the sniffer dog reacted
to an unattended backpack. The police, without obtaining a
search warrant, opened the backpack and found illicit drugs.
The trial judge excluded the evidence and acquitted the
accused. The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal. An
appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada.
WHAT APPROACH DID THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA TAKE?
In each of these decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada
was divided and three judgments were filed in each instance.
As a result, determining the ratio discendi can be difficult.
Interestingly, many years later, the Supreme Court suggested in
Spencer that while it was “divided on other points, it was
unanimous in holding that the dog sniff of Mr. Kang-Brown’s
bag constituted a search” (at paragraph 29). In R. v. Aucoin, 3
S.C.R. 408 (2012), the Supreme Court indicated that in Kang-
Brown it “recognized a common law power to conduct sniffer
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dog searches” (at paragraph 76). Finally, in R. v. MacDonald, 1
S.C.R. 37 (2014), the Court indicated that in Kang-Brown “a
majority of the Court recognized a common law power to con-
duct sniffer-dog searches” (at paragraph 32).
It appears that a majority of the Court in A.M. and Kang-
Brown concluded as follows:
1. A dog’s sniffing constitutes a search for the purposes
of section 8 of the Charter; and
2. The use of sniffer dogs is lawful based upon the
common-law powers of the police to investigate
crime. 
Five years after these two decisions were rendered, the
Supreme Court of Canada returned to the issue of the use of
sniffer dogs. Once again, it rendered two judgments (R. v.
Chehil, 2013 SCC 49, and R. v. MacKenzie, 2013 SCC 50).
However, this time the majority decisions are readily ascer-
tainable.
R. V. CHEHIL
In Chehil, the police checked the accused’s airplane luggage
by utilizing a drug detection dog. The dog gave a positive indi-
cation for the scent of drugs. The accused was arrested and his
luggage was searched. Three kilograms of cocaine was found. 
At the commencement of her decision in Chehil, Justice
Karakatsanis, writing for the entire Court, succinctly explained
what it had decided in A.M. and Chang-Brown (at paragraph 1):
The Court concluded that the use of a properly
deployed drug detection dog was a search that was
authorized by law and reasonable on a lower threshold of
“reasonable suspicion”. Because they are minimally
intrusive, narrowly targeted, and can be highly accurate,
sniff searches may be conducted without prior judicial
authorization. 
The Supreme Court also indicated that the appeal required
it “to elaborate on the principles underlying the reasonable
suspicion standard and its application.” This elaboration
resulted in the Supreme Court holding that the police can use
a drug detection dog without obtaining prior judicial autho-
rization if they have a “reasonable suspicion” based on objec-
tive, ascertainable facts, that evidence of an offence will be dis-
covered through the utilization of the dog. The Court indi-
cated that the “reasonable suspicion standard requires that the
entirety of the circumstances, inculpatory and exculpatory, be
assessed to determine whether there are objective ascertainable
grounds to suspect that an individual is involved in criminal
behaviour” (at paragraph 6).
The Supreme Court also indicated in Chehil that reasonable
suspicion “derives its rigour from the requirement that it be
based on objectively discernible facts, which can then be sub-
jected to independent judicial scrutiny. While reasonable
grounds to suspect and reasonable and probable grounds to
believe are similar in that they both must be grounded in
objective facts, reasonable suspicion is a lower standard, as it
engages the reasonable possibility, rather than probability, of
crime.… As a result, when applying the reasonable suspicion
standard, reviewing judges must
be cautious not to conflate it with
the more demanding reasonable
and probable grounds standard”
(at paragraphs 26 and 27).
However, the Court also indi-
cated that a constellation of fac-
tors “will not be sufficient to
ground reasonable suspicion
where it amounts merely to a
‘generalized’ suspicion because it ‘would include such a
number of presumably innocent persons as to approach a sub-
jectively administered, random basis’ for a search’… Indeed,
the reasonable suspicion standard is designed to avoid indis-
criminate and discriminatory searches” (at paragraph 30). The
Court also held that a “nexus must exist between the criminal
conduct that is suspected and the investigative technique
employed. . . . In the context of drug detection dogs, this nexus
arises by way of a constellation of facts that reasonably sup-
ports the suspicion of drug-related activity that the dog
deployed is trained to detect” (at paragraph 36).
Finally, the Court held in Chehil that the onus is on the
Crown “to show that the objective facts rise to the level of rea-
sonable suspicion, such that a reasonable person, standing in
the shoes of the police officer, would have held a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.” The Court pointed out that “the
reliability of a particular dog is also relevant to determining
whether a particular sniff search was conducted reasonably in
the circumstances” (at paragraph 45).
THE CONCLUSION IN CHEHIL
The Supreme Court indicated that when a sniffer dog deliv-
ers a positive indication, the police may arrest the suspect if
they have reasonable and probable grounds to do so. If the
arrest is valid, the police may conduct a search to secure evi-
dence without prior judicial approval. The Court stated that
this “is what occurred in this case” (at paragraph 55).
The Court concluded in Chehil that “considering the
strength of the constellation of factors that led to the decision
to deploy the dog, the reliability of the dog, and the absence of
exculpatory explanations, the positive indication raised the
reasonable suspicion generated by the constellation to the level
of reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused” (at
paragraph 76).  
R. V. MACKENZIE 
In MacKenzie, the accused was charged with possession of
a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking. The
police had stopped the accused’s vehicle for speeding. After the
vehicle was stopped, the investigating officer suspected that
the accused was involved in illegal drug activity. He detained
the accused and then utilized a drug detection dog to conduct
a perimeter search of the vehicle, resulting in a “positive” reac-
tion by the dog. The police arrested the accused and searched
his vehicle incident to the arrest. Thirty-one pounds of mari-
huana was found.
At the commencement of his reasons in McKenzie, Justice
Moldaver, writing for the majority of the Court, referred to Jus-
tice Karakatsanis’s reasons in Chehil, and indicated that her
[S]niff searches
may be 
conducted 
without prior
judicial 
authorization.
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“efforts have spared me the heavy
lifting in this case, as the broader
questions that I have just men-
tioned are fully canvassed in her
reasons.” He then indicated: “I
therefore concentrate here on the
application of the reasonable suspi-
cion standard to the facts of this
case. I also address certain addi-
tional issues that arise in the con-
text of a sniffer-dog search that
occurs subsequent to a roadside stop, as occurred here. The
Court did not address those issues in Kang-Brown and A.M.
and the facts of this case present an occasion for clarification
of the applicable principles” (at paragraph 3). 
SNIFFER DOGS AND MOTOR VEHICLES
Justice Moldaver noted in McKenzie that the Court “has
held that motor vehicles, though emphatically not Charter-free
zones, are places in which individuals have a reasonable but
‘reduced’ expectation of privacy. . . . The privacy context here
is thus analogous to the bus terminal in Kang-Brown and the
school in A.M., where the use of police sniffer dogs on the
basis of reasonable suspicion was found to pass Charter
muster. As a result, I am satisfied that the police here were enti-
tled to enlist the aid of a sniffer dog for crime prevention on
the same basis” (at paragraph 31).
WHAT IS REASONABLE SUSPICION?
The Court pointed out in McKenzie that reasonable suspi-
cion “must be assessed against the totality of the circum-
stances. Characteristics that apply broadly to innocent people
and ‘no-win’ behaviour—he looked at me, he did not look at
me—cannot on their own, support a finding of reasonable sus-
picion, although they may take on some value when they form
part of a constellation of factors” (at paragraph 71). However,
the Court also pointed out that “while it is critical that the line
between a hunch and reasonable suspicion be maintained to
prevent the police from engaging in indiscriminate or discrim-
inatory practices, it is equally vital that the police be allowed
to carry out their duties without undue scepticism or the
requirement that their every move be placed under a scanning
electron microscope” (at paragraph 65).
Justice Moldaver explained the concept of “reasonable sus-
picion” in the following manner (at paragraphs 73 and 74):
Assessing whether a particular constellation of facts
gives rise to a reasonable suspicion should not—indeed
must not—devolve into a scientific or metaphysical
exercise. Common sense, flexibility, and practical every-
day experience are the bywords, and they are to be
applied through the eyes of a reasonable person armed
with the knowledge, training and experience of the
investigating officer.
Parenthetically, I note that there are several ways of
describing what amounts to the same thing. Reasonable
suspicion means “reasonable grounds to suspect” as dis-
tinguished from “reasonable grounds to believe” (Kang-
Brown, at paras. 21 and 25, per Binnie J., and at para.
164, per Deschamps J.). To the extent one speaks of a
“reasonable belief” in the context of reasonable suspi-
cion, it is a reasonable belief that an individual might be
connected to a particular offence, as opposed to a rea-
sonable belief that an individual is connected to the
offence. As Karakatsanis J. observes in Chehil, the
bottom line is that while both concepts must be
grounded in objective facts that stand up to independent
scrutiny, “reasonable suspicion is a lower standard, as it
engages the reasonable possibility, rather than probabil-
ity, of crime” (para. 27).
THE CONCLUSION IN MCKENZIE
The Supreme Court concluded in McKenzie that “the police
had reasonable suspicion that the appellant was involved in a
drug-related offence such that they could enlist Levi to per-
form a sniff search of the appellant’s vehicle. The appellant’s s.
8 privacy rights were not breached and the marihuana seized
from the rear hatch of his car was thus admissible at trial” (at
paragraph 91).
A SUMMARY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S
DECISIONS
As we have seen, it is well settled in Canada that the use of
a sniffer dog constitutes a search that is protected by section 8
of the Charter. However, it is also well settled that Canadian
police can use sniffer dogs to search without prior judicial
authorization if they have the requisite reasonable suspicion.
In addition, if a Canadian police officer has reasonable and
probable grounds to arrest as a result of the use of a sniffer dog,
that officer can conduct a search incidental to the arrest. This
search does not require prior judicial authorization and
extends beyond a search of the person arrested (see R. v. Saeed,
1 S.C.R. 518). However, none of the cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Canada involved residences. 
The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the constitu-
tionality of sniffer-dog searches are based on two primary fac-
tors: (1) the reliability of such searches and (2) their non-inva-
sive nature. In addition, the Court’s granting of constitutional
validity to such searches was based upon the police having rea-
sonable suspicion. In Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superin-
tendent of Motor Vehicles), 3 S.C.R. (2015) 250, the Court noted
that “a high degree of accuracy has been crucial to endorsing
sniffer-dog searches on a lower standard of reasonable suspi-
cion” (at paragraph 67). 
It has been suggested by one author that the Supreme Court
has set the “standard for a sniff search in these kinds of loca-
tions” as a “possibility—not probability.” A standard “justified
by the minimally intrusive nature of sniff searches” (see Sonia
Lawrence, 2013: Constitutional Cases in Review (2014), 67
S.C.L.R. (2d) 3, at paragraph 51). 
In R. v. Zolmer, 2019 ABCA 93, the Alberta Court of Appeal
described these types of searches as examples of “air searches,”
which are not considered to be “intrusive” (at paragraph 32). In
R. v. Jackman, 2016 ONCA 121, it was noted that a “dog sniff is
minimally invasive on an individual’s privacy interests” (at
paragraph 26). In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada has
not limited dog-sniffer searches to border searches. The power
is broad enough to search at schools and in motor vehicles.
[T]he use of a
sniffer dog
constitutes a
search that is
protected by
section 8 of
the Charter.
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2. In R. v. Leipert (1997) 1 S.C.R. 281, the Court dealt with an
appeal in which, after receiving a tip from a Crime Stoppers pro-
gram, a police officer went to the accused’s residence with a snif-
fer dog and on “four different occasions the policeman and Bruno
walked the street in front of Leipert’s residence. Each time Bruno
indicated the presence of drugs in Leipert’s house.” The police
then obtained a search warrant. The “main allegations raised in
support of the warrant were the observations of the police officer
at the site.” When the search warrant was executed, evidence was
seized and the appellant was charged with cultivation of mari-
juana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.
In the Supreme Court of Canada, the appeal concerned disclosure
of the Crime Stoppers tip rather than the use of the dog’s reaction
to obtain a search warrant.
Where else it will be expanded to, if anywhere, waits to be seen. 
Despite their non-intrusive nature, the use of sniffer dogs
must comply with section 8 of the Charter. Thus, for a search
based upon the use of a sniffer dog to be reasonable, the police
must have reasonable grounds to suspect that a search will
reveal evidence of a criminal offence. This will depend, in part,
on the reliability of the dog utilized. In Goodwin, the Supreme
Court stated that the “reliability of a search or seizure mecha-
nism is directly relevant to the reasonableness of the search or
seizure itself.” The Court also indicated that the “high degree
of accuracy” involved in sniffer-dog searches was “crucial to
endorsing sniffer-dog searches on a lower standard of reason-
able suspicion” (at paragraph 67). Thus, the dog effectively
becomes the Crown’s most important witness. The dog’s “qual-
ifications” are an important element. 
CONCLUSION
Though the Supreme Court of Canada’s rulings in the dog-
sniff cases has provided Canadian police with a broad consti-
tutional search power, it is not an unlimited one. Consider R.
v. Molnar, 2018 MBCA 61, and R. v. Urban, 2017 ABCA 436.
These decisions illustrate that though reasonable suspicion is a
low standard, it must be objectively established and that it only
applies to the dog sniff, not any subsequent searches.
In Molnar, the accused was charged with the offence of pos-
session of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking. The police
had utilized a sniffer dog to test a suitcase in the baggage car
of a train. A positive reaction was obtained. The suitcase had
no identification. The accused was arrested, and the suitcase
was searched. Drugs were found and connected to her. The
trial judge ruled that the police had reasonable grounds to
arrest the accused and that the searches were incidental to her
arrest. The accused was convicted.
On appeal, the Manitoba Court of Appeal overturned the
conviction. The Court of Appeal noted that the “hit on the grey
suitcase by Bernie was compelling information that elevated
Constable Kristalovich’s reasonable suspicion that the grey
suitcase contained marijuana to reasonable grounds to believe
(subjectively and objectively) that it did.” However, the police
did not connect the bag to the accused before arresting her.
This led the Court of Appeal to hold that there “was no evi-
dence that the grey suitcase in question was the only grey suit-
case in the baggage car bound for Washago. While the evi-
dence was strong to establish a reasonable suspicion, particu-
larly after Bernie’s positive hit on the grey suitcase, in contrast
to the cases cited above, the required strong connection
between the grey suitcase and the accused for the RCMP to
have objective reasonable grounds to arrest her did not exist”
(at paragraph 35).
In Urban, the accused was convicted of the offence of pos-
sessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking. The convic-
tion was based upon evidence found by the police after deploy-
ing a sniffer dog to search the exterior of his vehicle. 
In setting aside the conviction, the Alberta Court of Appeal
indicated that though the “reasonable suspicion standard has
become a low bar particularly since Chehil and MacKenzie,”
the totality of the evidence did not support the officer’s “sub-
jective belief that Mr. Urban might be involved in a drug-
related offence. . . . Consequently, he lacked authority at
common law to detain Mr. Urban for the purpose of a con-
trolled substance investigation and to conduct a sniffer dog
search of the exterior of Mr. Urban’s vehicle, thereby breaching
Mr. Urban’s rights under s 9 (arbitrary detention) and s 8
(unreasonable search and seizure) of the Charter” (at para-
graph 44). 
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Canada has considered
sniffer-dog searches and given them their constitutional bless-
ing, but only at the initial investigative stage. Their use to
search residences has not been considered. As the Supreme
Court noted in MacKenzie, relying in part on a decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States, this case does not “involve
the use of sniffer dogs in contexts such as the home, where
courts have long recognized a heightened privacy interest (see,
e.g., R. v. Evans, 1 S.C.R. 8; Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409
(2013).”2
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